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The authors assess the effects of minority political incorporation in large cities. An interrupted 
time-series research design is used to determine whether the election of a city's first minority 
mayor has any short -term or long-term impact on fiscal policies. The authors examined six cities 
that elected black or Latino mayors and six cities with white mayors from 1972 to 1992. In gen-
eral, they find that minority political incorporation did not significantly change fiscal policies in 
different ways from that which occurred in cities without minority incorporation. 
As minority mayors have assumed power in America's cities, scholarly 
research has attempted to determine if this level of political incorporation 
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984) increases the level of responsiveness to 
the needs of minority citizens. Such responsiveness may take the form of 
greater expenditures for minority communities, alterations in city revenue 
and spending policies, and changes in other public policies that benefit 
minority groups. Many mayors are severely constrained in their ability to 
alter city spending and revenue patterns by economic circumstances and 
mandates placed on them by federal and state authorities-regardless of their 
racial or ethnic background (Peterson 1981). Many minority mayors have 
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had the misfortune of assuming power when these constraints were intensi-
fied by mounting economic pressures and dwindling intergovernmental 
assistance, particularly from federal sources (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 
1997; Keller 1978). Hence, the likelihood of significant change in city policy 
following the election of a minority mayor may be quite limited. 
In this article, we assess the impact of minority mayors more systemati-
cally than past research by applying a quasi-experimental pooled time-series 
research design to the question of whether a minority mayor who succeeds a 
white mayor has any short-term or long-term impact on city revenue and 
expenditure patterns. We examine six cities that elected black or Latino may-
ors and six comparison cities with white mayors between 1972 and 1992. Our 
purpose is to answer the following question: Does political incorporation 
matter over time? 
POLITICAL INCORPORATION 
The minority political incorporation model of Browning, Marshall, and 
Tabb (1984) has served as a theoretical benchmark for research on minority 
politics for more than a decade. The model holds that for a minority commu-
nity to witness an effective response to its needs, minority leaders must come 
to occupy positions of governmental authority. By extension, the election of 
minorities to the offices of city council member or mayor should result in 
greater responsiveness to minority public policy concerns (see also 
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997). 
Studies addressing potential policy changes following elections of minor-
ity mayors suggested that new black or Latino leaders were expected to meet 
the standards (both real and imagined) of their white predecessors and to 
assume office and improve the living standards of even their poorest constitu-
ents, in spite of severe institutional and economic constraints (Preston 1976; 
Bullock 1975; Nelson 1972). Recent research on difficulties facing minority 
mayors who attempted to assemble an effective governing coalition supports 
these findings (Reed 1986; Bennett 1993). Empirical studies of the subject, 
however, have found little difference in levels of fiscal policies by white and 
black mayors (Keller 1978; Nelson 1978). In contrast, Karnig and Welch 
(1980) provided evidence showing that over time, the presence of a black 
mayor led to significantly greater welfare expenditures; lower spending on 
city services such as parks, libraries, and fire protection; and more federal aid. 
The latest research on mayoral change in cities over time (Wolman, Strate, 
and Melchior 1996) has looked at policy change following a change in may-
oral administration. Using a time-series design, the authors compared cities 
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that changed mayors to a "control" group of cities that kept incumbents in 
office from 1974 to 1985. They found that changing mayors led to differences 
in expenditure policies when compared to cities that maintained incumbents. 
However, this study did not examine minority mayors replacing whites and 
the policy changes following this political transition. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Karnig and Welch (1980) looked at potential policy consequences of 
black mayoral leadership over time. Their study is instructive, but it analyzed 
a period (1968-1975) in which black public officials were only beginning to 
make inroads'into mayors' offices throughout the country. Wolman, Strate, 
and Melchior (1996) examined mayoral change over time but did not focus 
on change to minority leadership in cities. Our research combines both 
approaches by presenting a portrait of six large minority-led cities and their 
fiscal policies over time and compares these to similarly situated cities gov-
erned by white mayors during the same period. Both the effects of change and 
racial change can be examined in such a model. 
Following Campbell and Stanley (1966), a quasi-experimental 
time-series design is employed to test for potential policy effects of the ascen-
sion of minority mayors to power in six major U.S. cities. These cities elected 
minority mayors to succeed white administrations in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and they serve as the experimental cases in this analysis. Thus, the election of 
a minority mayor functions as the interruption (X) in the following time-
series design: 
For the sake of comparison, six cities that consistently had white mayors 
were selected as matches. The following criteria guided the matching of cit-
ies: (1) all cities are mayor-council in form,l (2) popUlations of paired cities 
are roughly comparable,2 and (3) whenever possible, experimental cities are 
paired with cities in the same state to ensure uniformity in functional respon-
sibilities. However, where in-state matching is not feasible, cities are paired 
by regional proximity, and responsibilities for funding education and public 
welfare services are the same as their experimental match. 
The six pairs of cities included in the analysis are reported in Table 1 along 
with the year in which a new minority mayor came to power. Spending and 
revenue trends are compared using the new mayor's second year in power as 
the intervention.3 Comparisons between groups of cities are made on three 
fiscal dependent variables reported annually in U.S. Bureau of the Census 
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sources:
4 general revenue per capita, intergovernmental revenue per capita, 
and general expenditures per capita.5 
Modeling past research (Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Meier 1980), three 
independent variables are included in the analysis to detect the impact, if any, 
of the newly elected minority mayor: first, a counter, coded 1,2,3, ... n, to 
assess any overall trend in the annual values of the dependent variables 
(yearly trend); second, a term for the slope, coded 0 before the interruption 
and 1 thereafter, to measure any short-term or immediate effect of the new 
mayor; and third, a term for the postinterruption change in slope, coded 0 
before the intervention and 1,2, 3, ... n thereafter, to measure any long-term 
policy impact of the new minority mayor. 
The method used in this analysis is feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS), appropriate for cases in which observations are pooled across time 
and space.6 FGLS accounts for serial correlation common to time-series 
applications and heteroscedasticity across panels common to cross-sectional 
analysis. Furthermore, because our cross-sectional units are not randomly 
selected households but cities with arbitrarily drawn boundaries, we do not 
expect the panels to be mutually independent. Rather, we allow for correla-
tion between the error terms of the separate panels (Kmenta 1997, 622).7 A 
separate pooled analysis is performed for the experimental cities and the 
comparison cities (i.e., those cities electing a minority mayor to succeed a 
white mayor and those cities electing white mayors throughout the time 
period). For each case (city), the same 21-yeartime period is analyzed: 1972 
through 1992. We assume that cities experienced similar forces as their match, 
such as the same changes in intergovernmental relations or federal aid. 
Table 1 displays the name of the first minority mayor selected in each city, 
along with their year of assuming office. The results for each group are com-
pared for differences in the effect of mayoral change on the independent fis-
cal measures. The intervention is measured one year following the election 
year because new mayors must work with their predecessors' budgets in their 
first year in office. The intervention year for an experimental city is the same 
one used for its matched comparison city. 
Our expectation, based on previous research, is that the election of a 
minority mayor will not have a significant effect on fiscal policies over time. 
FINDINGS 
The analysis begins with an examination of the effects of mayoral change 
on general revenues over time. Table 2 shows that among the experimental 
cities-those that elected a minority candidate to succeed a white mayor-
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TABLE 1: Experimental and Comparison Cities 
Experimental Cities Mayor Elected/Appointed Comparison Cities 
Chicago H. Washington 1983 Milwaukee 
Philadelphia W. Goode 1983 Pittsburgh' 
Baltimore C. Burns 1986b Boston 
New Orleans E. Morial 1977 Baton Rouge 
Denver F.Pena 1983 AlbuquerqueC 
Birmingham R. Arrington 1979 Montgomery d 
a. Richard S. Caliguiri became interim mayor of Pittsburgh in April 1977, then won election to 
that post in the following November. 
b. Clarence H. Burns became mayor by virtue of succession when William Donald Schaefer left 
the office to become governor of Maryland. Kurt L. Schmoke then defeated Burns in the Demo-
cratic primary ana became mayor of Baltimore in November 1987. 
c. Harry Kinney was elected to his second nonconsecutive term as mayor in November 1981. He 
first served as mayor from 1974 to 1977. 
d. Emory Folmar became mayor after winning a special election to replace James Robinson, 
who resigned the mayoralty. Folmar was reelected in 1979. 
the yearly trend in general revenue per capita was positive and significant. 
Likewise, the yearly trend in comparison cities with white mayoral adminis-
trations was that of significant growth but less than the rate in minority-led 
cities. Per capita general revenues increased $57 each year in cities electing a 
new minority mayor, as opposed to $37 in comparison cities. This trend 
appears to be unrelated to the election of a minority mayor because the 
matched cities had a similar, significant growth in revenue. The election of a 
new minority mayor demonstrated no significant short-term or long-term 
effects on general revenues. Each model was significant and demonstrated 
that there were no differences between the two groups of cities on changes in 
general revenue policy. 
The effects of mayoral change on per capita intergovernmental revenues 
are also shown in Table 2. The results were similar to those for general reve-
nues. The yearly trend in intergovernmental revenue per capita was positive 
and significant for both the experimental and comparison groups. Cities 
electing minority mayors added $18 in intergovernmental revenue per capita, 
whereas cities with white mayors over the time period added $20. Mayoral 
change demonstrated no significant short-term effects on intergovernmental 
revenue. The long-term effect of mayoral change was negative and signifi-
cant in experimental cities, with a decrease of $12.50 per capita. But a similar 
long-term effect was shown in the comparison cities, with a $13.40 decrease. 
Both models were significant and show that there were no statistically signifi-
cant differences in intergovernmental revenue per capita between cities that 
elected minority mayors and those that did not. 
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TABLE 2: Effects of Change in Mayors on City Government Finances, 
1972-1992 (n = 126) 
Intergovernmental General 
General Revenue Revenue Expenditures 
Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita 
Independent Experi- Com- Experi- Com- Experi- Com-
Variables mental parison mental parison mental parison 
Time (counter) 57.35*** 36.62*** 18.24*** 20.01 *** 53.11 *** 39.11*** 
SE 5.78 3.83 3.49 2.95 8.21 5.82 
Short term -29.64 -24.19 -6.15 -4.22 -52.77 26.98 
SE 19.17 16.85 12.70 14.94 29.23 31.24 
Longterm 12.75 -0.15 -12.49** -13.39** 16.19 -5.09 
SE . 8.97 5.88 5.10 4.58 12.68 10.04 
Intercept 264.37*** 220.24*** 54.47 50.37* 266.82** 149.69** 
SE 80.20 47.62 36.64 23.10 87.20 49.19 
Log likelihood -619.05 -611.47 -559.56 -599.19 -673.59 -724.89 
Wald chi 232.79*** 245.07*** 35.94*** 77.76*** 138.85*** 141.48*** 
*p ~ .05. **p ~ .01. ***p ~ .001. 
The final column in Table 2 shows the effect of mayoral change on general 
expenditures per capita. For both groups of cities-those changing to minor-
ity administrations and those maintaining white administrations-the yearly 
trend in general expenditures per capita showed positive and significantly 
higher spending. Expenditures per capita increased by $53 in experimental 
cities and by $39 in the matched group of cities. Neither the short-term nor 
the long-term effects on spending were significant in either group of cities. 
Both models of expenditures were significant and showed that minority-led 
cities' spending patterns were not statistically different from spending in 
similar cities over the same time period. 
We analyzed several functional areas of city spending too. Our pooled 
time-series analysis of per capita spending on police, fire, parks and recre-
ation, and housing and community development did not reveal any statisti-
cally significant differences in minority-led cities. 
DISCUSSION 
After nearly 30 years of witnessing minority candidates succeeding white 
mayors in big cities, the following question has lingered: What differences in 
fiscal policy result from the election of a minority mayor? Does minority 
political incorporation really matter in fiscal policy areas? Having 
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successfully established a winning electoral coalition, do minority mayors 
act differently in policy making than their white counterparts? 
We have examined these questions over time in 12 cities-6 cities electing 
blacks or Latinos as mayor and a comparable group of 6 cities that did not 
change to minority administrations. We studied the short-term and long-term 
effects of mayoral change and did so across two sets of fiscal policy areas, 
revenues and expenditures. From these findings, we may conclude that elec-
toral change that produces minority political incorporation may not dramati-
cally change policies. Revenue policies per capita do not seem to be altered 
following minority incorporation. 
Wolman, Strate, and Melchior (1996) found that changing mayors in 
mayor council cities led to higher real per capita spending. What our findings 
suggest is that changing to a minority mayor may not produce similar growth. 
Minority mayors may develop an effective governing coalition or urban 
regime after some time in office that gives them the leverage needed to redi-
rect some key spending areas. But it appears that newly elected minority 
mayors, unlike their white counterparts who are either incumbents or newly 
elected, may still face obstacles that prevent them from having a significant 
impact on the city budget (Bennett 1993). 
This research suggests that there are limitations to the normative expecta-
tions of fiscal policy changes with minority political incorporation. Signifi-
cant changes in city revenues and spending per capita were not apparent in 
our 2l-year study. The actual policy impacts of political incorporation over 
time may be much more modest than proponents would expect. 
NOTES 
I. One of the comparison cities, Montgomery, was a commission government that changed 
to mayor council in 1979. 
2. The greatest disparity in population exists in the Chicago-Milwaukee match. Chicago's 
population outstrips Milwaukee's by more than 2 million persons over the course of this analy-
sis. Similarly, Philadelphia consistently has over 1 million more inhabitants than Pittsburgh. The 
popUlation difference between the rest of the pairs averages about 250,000. 
3. The interruption is lagged one year under the assumption that any mayor's policy impact 
will not be felt in his or her first year when operating under the outgoing administration's budget. 
4. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances (various years). 
5. City population changes between census years were evenly distributed across the years 
(e.g., a population gain of 100,000 between 1970 and 1980 would result in an increase of 10,000 
to a city population in each year from 1971 to 1980). 
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6. Specifically, we use the "xtg1s" command in Stata 6.0. 
7. Following Beck and Katz (1995), we also estimated the models in this analysis using 
panel-corrected standard errors. However, regardless of method-feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) or ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors-our substantive 
conclusions do not change. Thus, we report only the FGLS estimates. 
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